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Challenges to California Foreclosures 
Based on MERS Transfers 
Roger Bernhardt and Alex Volkov 
Introduction 
In February, the Fourth District court of appeal handed down its decision in Gomes v 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 CA4th 1149, 121 CR3d 819 (reported at 34 
CEB RPLR 66 (Mar. 2011)echanism of MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc.) transfers, thereby implicitly validating the secondary market process by 
which MERS operates in California and throughout the rest of the country. To spare 
readers from having to dredge up t 
Background: The MERS System 
As readers know, a mortgage loan begins its existence with the borrower’s execution of a 
note, promising to repay the loan, and (in California) a deed of trust, entitling the lender 
to foreclose and sell the borrower’s real property if the loan is not paid. In a plain-vanilla 
situation, both instruments are made out to the lender—as payee of the note and as 
beneficiary of the deed of trust. The deed of trust, as a title document, is recorded; the 
note, not affecting title, is not. (Because of historical quirks, title to the property is 
technically held by a trustee, different from both payor/trustor and beneficiary.) Since the 
two documents represent a single loan obligation, they would sensibly be kept together. 
However, when the lender desires to transfer the loan, complications arise. The note 
should be endorsed (or assigned) and physically transferred to each new holder, a 
transaction regulated by Article 3 of the Commercial Code, whether it is a mortgage note 
or an unsecured note. The deed of trust, on the other hand, should be assigned, and 
perhaps physically transferred, but it is not endorsed like a note is, and its assignment 
should be recorded, just as the original deed of trust was, and unlike anything done with 
the note. 
The rise of the secondary market and its attendant multiple transfers and pooling of loan 
documents led to concern over the recordation requirement of assignments of deeds of 
trust and the recordation fees (and, in some states, imposition of transfer taxes). MERS, 
invented in 1993, offered a clever bypass: By putting the deed of trust in the name of 
MERS directly, as some sort of agent of the true lender, and keeping the document under 
the MERS name, mortgage transfers could merely be made inside MERS’s electronic 
database and outside the public records until the end of the life of the loan (whether by a 
payoff or through a foreclosure), at which point MERS would execute and record a 
formal assignment to the last beneficiary. 
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The drafting mechanism chosen to accomplish this was the naming of MERS as 
“nominee” and “beneficiary of record” in the deed of trust, separate from the lender. (The 
document typically recites, “MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a 
nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS is the beneficiary under 
this Security Instrument.” In other jurisdictions, MERS is named as “the mortgagee in a 
nominee capacity for [the lender] ... MERS is a company separate from your lender that 
operates an electronic tracking system for mortgage rights. MERS is not your lender; it is 
a company that provides an alternative means of registering the mortgage lien in the 
public records.... Naming MERS as the mortgagee and registering the mortgage on the 
MERS electronic tracking system does not affect your obligation to your lender, under 
the Promissory Note.”) Unsurprisingly, MERS is not named in the note—as lender, 
payee, or anything else. 
Consistent with all of that, the loan documents in Gomes showed KB Home Mortgage 
Company (a retail outlet for Countrywide) as the original “lender,” First American 
Trustee Company as “Trustee” under the deed of trust, and MERS as “nominee” for 
beneficiary (in one place) and “beneficiary” (in another) in that document. The deed of 
trust was then apparently assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon FKA The Bank of 
New York as Trustee for a trust, with Countrywide Home Loans as servicer and 
ReconTrust (a division of Countrywide) being later substituted in (probably by MERS) as 
trustee for the trustee’s sale. (Countrywide has been taken over by Bank of America, but 
that “transfer” can be ignored for our purposes here.) 
The Litigation Posture 
Gomes filed his lawsuit in May, before Countrywide seemed close to conducting a trustee 
sale of the property. (Because Countrywide sent its notice of default (NOD) in March, 
notice of sale could not have been given before June—at the earliest—making an actual 
sale unlikely to occur before July.) The suit was therefore not one to set aside any 
completed sale, nor (peculiarly) even to stay or enjoin any threatened pending sale, but 
rather solely for damages for “wrongful initiation of foreclosure,” i.e., the sending of the 
NOD. 
Further, according to the complaint, Countrywide’s initiation of foreclosure was not 
allegedly wrongful for any particularized reason (such as that the loan was predatory or 
had been induced by fraud, or that Gomes was not in default, or that Countrywide had 
promised to forebear, or that some impropriety had occurred in the loan transfers). 
According to Gomes, foreclosure would be wrongful because the transfer process itself—
even when in perfect conformity with MERS regulations—did not entitle the ultimate 
transferee of the original lender to conduct a trustee sale against a borrower, even when 
that borrower was admittedly in default. 
While that contention might be viewed as a bit audacious, it also means that a court’s 
rejection of it is hardly devastating to the foreclosure defense bar. All of the “real” 
defenses that other borrowers have against foreclosure are left unimpaired by Gomes’s 
loss. Gomes’s defeat is somewhat like going back from strict to negligence liability: 
Borrowers will have to show that their lenders actually did something wrong before those 
borrowers will be excused from having to pay their mortgage. 
As another, but important, side effect, the demand on the judiciary to review the 
foreclosure process is significantly lightened by the court’s rejection of Gomes’s second 
cause of action—one for declaratory relief as to whether the foreclosure seller was “duly 
authorized to do so by the owner of a beneficial interest” in the loan. Success on that 
claim might have allowed borrowers to compel judicial review of the entire loan transfer 
process—and perhaps also, by extension, the default and foreclosure process—in every 
case, simply by asking for it. Upholding Gomes’s cause of action for declaratory relief 
would have gone a long way toward appeasing critics of our nonjudicial foreclosure 
process, who complain of its total immunity from any review by any government official 
at any stage (although it might still have required the borrower to initiate some kind of 
action to bring an official into the picture, rather than requiring the lender to—as a matter 
of course—get its own stamp of approval from the official before selling). 
Because the complaint was treated as a sort of facial attack on all MERS-related 
secondary market transfers, the opinion did not pay much attention to any particularized 
claims of defect or harm. The court said, in a footnote, that the complaint might be 
arguing that MERS lacked authorization from the current holder of the note to initiate 
foreclosure (the NOD was sent by ReconTrust, describing itself as MERS’s agent), or 
that MERS might lack standing to do so, even if it was authorized. These contentions 
were rejected, but on grounds that were not made very clear. 
The Merits 
Civil Code §2924a provides that “If, by the terms of any trust or deed of trust a power of 
sale is conferred upon the trustee, the attorney for the trustee, or any duly authorized 
agent, may conduct the sale and act in the sale as the auctioneer for the trustee.” 
Vexingly, §2924(a)(1)§2924c(e)§2924d§2924.7ns make some reference to an agent. The 
reference to agency in §2924(a)(1) allowed the court to say that the clause in the deed of 
trust whereby Gomes agreed that MERS could foreclose barred him from challenging its 
authority to do so, and apparently gave MERS such authority, at least as an agent of the 
beneficiary, whether or n 
Outside the Trustee Sale Context 
The Gomes holding can be read in different ways. Broadly, it might mean that the entire 
MERS secondary market transfer process is valid (as long as each step is done properly). 
More narrowly, the findings of validity could be limited to the case of (1) a trustee sale 
(2) conducted directly by MERS, leaving open the issues of (3) judicial foreclosures and 
(4) foreclosure proceedings of any sort brought not by MERS itself, but by a successor 
lender who had taken an assignment from MERS. 
The intellectual difficulty in being an assignee from MERS is that the assignment 
transfers only the deed of trust, not the note (which MERS never had). Civil Code §2936s 
always held that the transferee of the note will prevail over the transferee of the 
mortgage, and is the only one entitled to foreclose (Adler v Sargent (1895) 109 C 42, 48), 
being assignee of the deed of trust from MERS does not seem to accomplish much when 
that assignee is not the holder of th financial interest in the note. MERS v Saunders 
(2010) 2 A3d 289.) 
On the other hand, CCP §725a appears to go in the other direction, permitting the holder 
of the security to bring a foreclosure action, whether or not it also holds the note. The 
section states: 
The beneficiary or trustee named in a deed of trust or mortgagee named in a mortgage 
with power of sale upon real property or any interest therein to secure a debt or other 
obligation, or if there be a successor or successors in interest of such beneficiary, trustee 
or mortgagee, then such successor or successors in interest, shall have the right to bring 
suit to foreclose the same in the manner and subject to the provisions, rights and remedies 
relating to the foreclosure of a mortgage upon such property. 
That language does not seem to require a deed of trust beneficiary to also hold or have an 
interest in the note secured by that deed of trust. 
However, concerns about MERS’s right to foreclose are somewhat like maneuvering 
chairs around on the Titanic—given that MERS has announced that it intends to no 
longer do any foreclosing in its own name. On February 16, 2011, MERS proposed new 
rules that prohibit its members from initiating foreclosures in the name of MERS. 
(Freddie Mac has recently done the same, and Fannie Mae took the same position some 
time ago.) Thus, the Gomes decision upholds a procedure that soon will be obsolete. 
MERS as Intermediate Transferor 
Withdrawal of MERS from direct foreclosure activity does not mean that trustee sales in 
California will stop. When defaults occur, MERS will instead assign the deeds of trust 
that it has held in its own name as nominee for the original lenders to the new, current 
holders of the promissory notes secured by those deeds of trust, so that they—now as 
both holder of the note and assignee of the deed of trust—can foreclose in their own 
name. From the point of view of compliance with Gomes standards, the process should be 
even easier to justify: The new lender need not prove that it is the authorized agent of the 
trustee or beneficiary since it is in fact, itself, the beneficiary. 
But the foreclosure defense bar is not likely to roll over and die because of this new 
process. Battles will go on in different forums and over different issues. The federal 
courts have not been fully heard from (there appear to be far more federal decisions 
involving MERS than state court ones, but not yet from higher courts). The challenges 
will no longer be to MERS’s power to foreclose but rather to its power to assign the 
mortgages and deeds of trust to the ultimate lenders, so that they can properly foreclose. 
On that question, the outcome so far is decidedly mixed. 
Bankruptcy Court Rulings on MERS 
Some striking anti-MERS rulings have come from bankruptcy courts, inside and outside 
California. The challenge started in the Central District of California in 2008, when 
Bankruptcy Judge Bufford held that MERS lacked standing to lift a bankruptcy stay 
unless it could produce separate agency contracts from each of the various lenders who 
had held the promissory note during its various transfers. (“MERS is no longer an 
authorized agent of the holder unless it has a separate agency contract with the new 
undisclosed principal.”) In re Vargas (Bankr CD Cal 2008) 396 BR 511, 517, reported at 
32 CEB RPLR 10 (Jan. 2009). The following year, an Idaho bankruptcy court denied 
MERS relief from stay because it was not a true beneficiary of the deed of trust receiving 
some actual economic benefit from it, nor a properly designated agent of the current 
holder of the note. In re Sheridan (Bankr D Idaho, Mar. 12, 2009, No. 08–20381-TLM) 
2009 Bankr Lexis 552, *4\it could transfer the mortgage, but that would not carry the 
loan along with it. In re Box (Bankr WD Mo, June 3, 2010, No. 10–20086) 2010 Bankr 
Lexis 1637. 
More significantly, another bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of California 
concluded that since MERS had no interest in the underlying note, it could not transfer 
the beneficial interest in the companion deed of trust. In re Walker (Bankr ED Cal, May 
20, 2010, No. 10–21656-E-11) 2010 Bankr Lexis 3781, *6Any attempt to transfer the 
beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under 
Californiand others, holding that designation of MERS as nominee of deed of trust did 
not give it the authority to transfer the loan withVega v CTX Mortgage Co. (D Nev, Jan. 
19, 2011, No. 3:10-cv-00405-RCJ-VPC) 2011 US Dist Lexis 6170, *3. 
An even greater threat to the MERS process came from the February 10, 2011, decision 
of a bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of New York in In re Agard (Bankr ED NY 
2011) 444 BR 231, in which the court ruled against the effectiveness of these transfers on 
almost every conceivable ground. New York uses mortgages and generally forecloses 
them judicially; in that context, Judge Grossman ruled that a foreclosing lender (1) would 
need to hold both the mortgage and the note in order to foreclose; (2) with regard to the 
note, would need to show a written assignment or physical possession plus proper 
endorsement; and (3) with regard to the mortgage, would need to show proper possession 
of that instrument as well, notwithstanding its valid possession of the note. Furthermore, 
(4) MERS would have to show authority to assign the mortgage, a conclusion it could not 
establish by virtue of merely having been named nominee; nor by (5) the MERS 
membership rules, which do not sufficiently demonstrate agency; nor by (6) state agency 
law, which in New York includes an equal dignid authority to foreclose in its own right 
simply because it had been named mortgagee of record; (8) an assignment by MERS 
would have to show MERS as nominee of the current lender, not the original lender; and 
finally (9) MERS would also need written authority from the current lender to assign the 
mo 
What does that say for California? Some of these rulings are not serious obstacles. Point 
7 above, regarding MERS foreclosing in its own name, can be disregarded since MERS 
no longer does that. Point 1, as to the requirements of foreclosure, should also be 
inapplicable to a California trustee sale, which is a nonjudicial proceeding and subject to 
its own special statute. With regard to points 2 and 3, Gomes appears to hold that the 
foreclosing party in a California trustee’s sale need not possess either the note or the deed 
of trust, such as Agard demanded in New York. 
Many of Agard’s other challenges to MERS assignments seem largely correctable, both 
for past transactions and future ones. The Agard holdings that MERS needs written 
authority to assign (applicable in California as well) (point 6) and that it needs such 
written authority from the current note holder (point 9) should be curable by execution of 
new forms of documentation, properly granting, affirming, and ratifying all of MERS’s 
past and future acts. Such authorization would eliminate the need to argue about the 
effect of MERS membership rules (point 5) and perhaps also about the effect of its 
dubious use of the term “nominee” (point 4) to describe its status—after all, if MERS is a 
properly authorized agent, it may not matter whether it also calls itself a nominee. 
Several other bankruptcy courts elsewhere in the country have rejected most of Agard’s 
contentions. Nominee status has been held to confer proper authority to transfer in In re 
Corley (Bankr SD Ga, Feb. 7, 2011, No. 10–4033) 2011 Bankr Lexis 807 and In re Lopez 
(Bankr D Mass, Feb. 9, 2011, No. 09–10346) 2011 Bankr Lexis 476. MERS has been 
held to have generally sufficient authority to assign its security instruments. Lane v Vitek 
Real Estate Indus. Group (ED Cal 2010) 713 F Supp 2d 1092; In re Tucker (Bankr WD 
Mo 2010) 441 BR 638; In re Martinez (Bankr D Kan 2011) 444 BR 192. 
Gomes itself said very little about assignments by MERS, other than to brush aside some 
claims of suspected, backdated transfers. (Improperly handled assignments generate a 
separate, independent set of issues—see, e.g., United States Bank N.A. v Ibanez (Mass 
2011) 941 NE2d 40Gomes appears to be generally favorable to the idea of MERS validly 
transferring deeds of trust to foreclosing lenders. 
But, almost as proof of how uncertain the terrain is, another bankruptcy court in 
California subsequently rejected Gomes entirely, holding that MERS transfers just do not 
work. In re Salazar (Bankr SD Cal, Apr. 12, 2011, No. 10–17456-MM13) 2011 Bankr 
Lexis 1187. (This decision appeared as we were finalizing this article, making it 
impossible for us to perfectly integrate all of its holdings and compelling this rather 
separate, serial treatment of it.) 
In re Salazar 
In In re Salazar, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of California dealt with a 
situation in which US Bank had conducted a nonjudicial trustee sale and then filed an 
unlawful detainer, and was now attempting to lift the automatic stay triggered by the 
trustor’s Chapter 13 filing on the eve of trial of that unlawful detainer action. 
The particular challenge raised in Salazar was based on the fact that US Bank had not 
recorded the assignment to it of the deed of trust from MERS before conducting its 
trustee sale, contrary to CC §2932.5h (The statute is not mentioned at all in Gomes.) This 
defect, almost visible on its face, would have been sufficient to keep the stay in place and 
might have rendered the cou 
It was perfectly easy for the court to determine, as an initial matter, that CC §2932.5 
applied to deeds of trust, even though it refers only to mortgages and even though various 
California federal district courts hlosure defense attorneys often complain of the 
difficulty of locating the proper person to deal with because of the opaqueness of the loan 
transfer process; the Salazar court has manifested its sympathy with that position. 
Whether recordation by the assignee will truly alleviate this difficulty as fatal as 
backdating or robosigning. 
It was equally easy to rule that this recording requirement was not satisfied by the fact 
that MERS was itself of record. MERS was not the beneficiary at the time of foreclosure. 
That MERS was not conducting the foreclosure should have been enough to both settle 
the technical recording issue and completely distinguish away Gomes, where MERS itself 
was the foreclosing party. But the Salazar court could not resist the opportunity to 
declare its disagreement with the reasoning in Gomes. “Even if US Bank had not replaced 
MERS as the foreclosing beneficiary by the time of foreclosure here, MERS still had no 
authority to nonjudicially foreclose under Salazar’s deed of trust under its express terms.” 
(A footnote adds that MERS would also not qualify as one entitled to payment under 
§2923.5, since it did not hold the note.) Gomes was not good state law, worth being 
followed by a federal court. The provisions of CC §2924(a)(1), allowing agents to 
foreclose, do not trump the requirement of CC §2923.5, that assignments must be 
recorded before foreclosures start. 
The Salazar court’s rejection of the Gomes rationale went further. The standard 
provisions in a MERS deed of trust on which Gomes had relied, especially those giving 
MERS the right to foreclose, applied only when “necessary to comply with law or 
custom,” a phrase the court found to be meaningless and amounting to an invalid waiver 
of lenders’ duties to comply with California’s foreclosure statutes. Those provisions 
certainly do not validate unrecorded assignments of the deed of trust. “As a matter of law, 
Salazar’s acknowledgment cannot be read as a waiver of his right to be informed of a 
change in beneficiary status.” 
Finally, the MERS process itself received some gratuitous insults. The beginning of the 
Salazar opinion states that “MERS’ original involvement in this loan does not provide 
talismanic protection against US Bank’s foreclosure deficiencies” and its ending adds 
that “the Court also rejects US Bank’s invitation to overlook the statutory foreclosure 
mandates of California law, and rely on MERS as an extra-judicial commercial 
alternative.... This Court instead joins the courts in other states that have rejected MERS’ 
offer of an alternative to the public recording system.” (Emphasis in original; citing, inter 
alia, In re Agard.) 
The Shaky Effect of Giving MERS Only the Deed of Trust 
An unavoidable observation from all of these fights is that the doctrine that the mortgage 
automatically follows the note runs into trouble when MERS enters the picture and takes 
only the mortgage, leaving the note somewhere else. See, e.g., Davidson v Countrywide 
Home Loans (SD Cal, July 23, 2010, No. 09-CV-2694-IEG (JMA)) 2010 US Dist Lexis 
74406. Whether a court holds that the transaction is thereby invalid, or valid 
notwithstanding the separation, the situation is no longer easy to resolve. A mortgage or 
deed of trust disconnected from its supporting promissory note is an odd creature. The 
desig 
The system itself is much to blame for all this uncertainty. The world deals one way with 
regard to the transfer of commercial paper and another way with regard to the transfer of 
real estate instruments. Commercial paper comes under Article 3 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, wherein notes are negotiable or nonnegotiable, are not recorded, and 
are generally transferred by endorsement, and where possession of them is very 
important. Real estate instruments, in contrast, are generally (although not entirely) 
governed by local lir physical possession not very important. The real estate rules of bona 
fide purchaser are not the same as the commercial rulesllectually challenging. 
When the secondary market arose in the 1980s, incompatibilities between the two 
systems generated enough inconvenience to prompt the creation of MERS as an attempt 
to avoid the delays, inconveniences, and costs of the recording system so that mortgages 
could be bundled and transferred as commercial paper. But those who midwifed MERS’s 
birth may have paid insufficient attention to old real estate doctrines, especially the 
principle of “numerus clausus” (“closed number”)—which prohibits the creation of new 
forms of ownership without the approval of the appropriate authorities. See Merrill & 
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 
110 Yale LJ 1 (2000)to accept. 
 
